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    Ceylon Today2026-02-07

    Sri Lanka: Recovered on Paper but Not Rebuilt Its Engine

    Originally published in Ceylon Today on 2026-02-07.

    Read Original Article on Ceylon Today

    Core Argument

    Sri Lanka's macro recovery is no longer theoretical. Growth for 2026 is projected around 4.5 to 5 percent. Inflation has normalised to low single digits. Foreign reserves have been rebuilt. By any post-crisis standard, this is stability. Yet most operators do not feel momentum. They feel constrained. Recovery has occurred without a corresponding rebuild of productive capital. Gross fixed capital formation remains structurally low relative to what the economy needs to scale. Public capex has hovered in the 3 to 5 percent of GDP range, and private investment has recovered slowly, capital largely flowing to short-term or liquid assets rather than long-duration productive capacity. Economies don't scale on stability alone. They scale on accumulated capital stock. What exists today is a consumption-supported recovery, not an investment-led expansion. Tourism, remittances and reconstruction provide demand, but demand without capacity deepening hits limits quickly. Debt servicing absorbs a large share of government revenue. Capital projects get delayed, resized or deprioritised, creating a crowding-out trap. Private capital hesitates not because opportunity is absent but because system signals remain weak. Inside firms this shows up as manufacturers postponing automation, exporters delaying compliance investment, hospitality operating below productivity benchmarks despite strong demand. At Rs 500 million to Rs 2 billion in annual revenue, many firms hit hard ceilings, unable to add shifts or replicate operations reliably. The common misdiagnoses miss the point: FDI doesn't arrive in shallow systems, it co-invests where domestic capacity already exists. Interest rates matter less than risk perception and weak investment multipliers. Credit is available but used for survival, not scale-enabling assets. This is not a liquidity crisis. It is a capital allocation failure. Vietnamese mid-sized exporters invested early in certification and supplier digitisation during uncertain periods, and that preparation became decisive when supply chains reconfigured later. Stability is not the destination. It is the entry condition. The next cycle belongs to operators who invest while others optimise survival.

    What I'd Revise Now

    This column's growth forecast, 4.5 to 5 percent for 2026, has held: Q1 2026 GDP came in at 5.1 percent, the strongest pace in three quarters, at the top of the range this column projected in February. The investment picture is more complicated than the column's framing, and worth correcting precisely. The Central Bank's own Q1 2026 data shows banking sector credit growth accelerating sharply to 24.4 percent year-on-year, up from 7.9 percent a year earlier, with the credit-to-deposit ratio surpassing 70 percent for the first time in three years. That is real acceleration in private lending, more than this column's February framing of "credit is available but used for survival" fully anticipated. But the composition matters, and it partly vindicates the column rather than contradicting it. Finance company lending surged 52.4 percent year-on-year, driven mainly by vehicle and gold-backed lending, not the automation, certification or capacity investment this column argues Sri Lankan firms need. Credit is flowing faster. It is still not obviously flowing into the productive capital stock this column's central argument is actually about. The gap this column names, between credit availability and genuine capacity deepening, is narrower than in February but has not closed.

    Key Takeaways

    • Sri Lanka has a consumption-supported recovery, not an investment-led one; tourism and remittances provide demand without deepening capacity
    • Public capex has held near 3-5 percent of GDP, well below what a scaling economy needs
    • Credit is genuinely available but gets used for survival and working capital, not scale-enabling assets
    • FDI co-invests where domestic capacity already exists; it does not arrive to build shallow systems from scratch
    • Vietnam's exporters invested in certification and digitisation during uncertainty, and that preparation paid off when global supply chains reconfigured

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