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    Sunday Observer2026-07-05

    Sri Lanka’s SMEs are small as nothing forces them to scale

    Originally published in Sunday Observer on 2026-07-05.

    Read Original Article on Sunday Observer

    Core Argument

    Sri Lanka's economy grew 5.1 percent in the first quarter of 2026, the strongest pace in three quarters. In a Moratuwa coir exporter's back office or a Kurunegala packaging firm, nothing about that number is felt. Growth at the macro level and stagnation at the operating level are not contradictions. They are the same economy read from two altitudes. The Ceylon Chamber's Scale Up 2.0 National SME Forum put the gap back on the table. SMEs are the overwhelming majority of registered businesses and provide most employment, and they are also the part of the economy least able to convert a recovering macro environment into compounding growth. They are not failing to grow because demand is missing. They are failing because the internal architecture needed to absorb growth was never built. Most Sri Lankan SMEs are built around one person who sells, negotiates, manages cash, runs payroll and still answers the phone. A business with no middle management layer cannot expand past what one person can personally supervise, which caps most firms between ten and fifty employees. Beyond it, quality slips and delivery slips, and the owner either stops taking orders or takes them and breaks promises. The standard policy answer has been financial: concessional credit, interest subsidies, occasional relief. These aim at a symptom. A business without accounting, documented processes or a record of consistent output cannot absorb a larger loan even when offered one, because a bank lending against a paper trail cannot lend against a trail that does not exist. Vietnam is the precedent, and it is unglamorous. Rather than financing small manufacturers into larger versions of themselves, it built clusters where a small firm could plug into a supply chain anchored by a larger exporter. The firm did not need to become large. It needed to become reliable enough to be a dependable node in someone else's chain.

    What I'd Revise Now

    Q2 national accounts had not been released when this ran and still had not by early September, so the 5.1 percent Q1 figure remains the latest reading. What has changed is the input side, and it strengthens the argument rather than dating it. The Q1 composition is worth stating plainly, because I skipped it. Industry grew 7.2 percent, services 3.4 and agriculture 1.1. Almost all the headline came from the sector where these SMEs sit, which makes the operating-layer stagnation harder to explain away as a sectoral mismatch. Since July, Parliament has ratified the tariff overhaul. CESS halves in 2026 on 693 intermediate and capital goods codes, with further cuts in 2027 and 2028. That is a direct reduction in raw material cost for exactly the manufacturers this column is about. Which sharpens the point rather than softening it. Cheaper inputs are only capturable by a firm that can price a job, document a process and quote a volume buyer. The firms with a ledger will take the margin. The firms without one will see cheaper materials arrive and still be unable to sell into a contract that requires consistency. The reform widened the gap between the two.

    Key Takeaways

    • A 5.1 percent macro growth rate and a stagnant SME operating layer are the same economy read from two altitudes, not a contradiction
    • The owner who runs everything is the ceiling, and it sits somewhere between ten and fifty employees
    • Concessional credit treats a symptom: a business with no paper trail cannot absorb a larger loan even when offered one
    • Formalisation is what converts a firm into something institutional buyers, export markets and formal lenders can transact with
    • Vietnam engineered scale through structure, letting small firms become reliable nodes rather than waiting for them to grow large

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